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ABSTRACT
RACHEL A. SURMINSKY: Estimating the Ideology of Primary Electorates
(Under the direction of Sarah A. Treul.)
Studies of racial profiling typically focus on a White/Black or White/minority dichotomy.
In this project, I extend that analysis to multiple racial, gender, and class groups. I use
data from every traffic stop that occurred in six states over multiple years, amounting to
more than 15 million traffic stops. Using this original and unique dataset, I am able to
draw conclusions about the outcomes that individual drivers face as a result of their inter-
sectional racial, gender, and class-based perceived identities. I attribute this phenomenon
to widely held stereotypes about social groups, rather than to individually racist police of-
ficers. Overall, I find that social groups that are stereotyped as more suspicious receive
the harshest treatment from police, while those who are not considered suspicious receive
lighter treatment, in the aggregate.
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INTRODUCTION
More so today than in the past, congressional districts favor one party over the other (Car-
son, Crespin, Eaves and Wanless 2012). With increased frequency, voters are casting parti-
san ballots (Jacobson 2009). In the 2016 general election, just thirteen House seats switched
party control and 96% of general election voters selected a presidential and congressional
candidate from the same party (Carson, Roberts and Surminsky 2017). General elections
have become increasingly consistent, producing predictably partisan outcomes. Primary
elections, however, have become less predictable. Since 2010, the number of unopposed
primary elections has dropped dramatically, demonstrating a shift towards greater intra-
party competition (Porter and Treul 2018). Incumbents from safely partisan districts who
would presumably win in the general election now fear losing to an in-party challenger in
the primary. For some members of Congress it seems the threat of losing reelection has
shifted from the general election to the primary election.
Competitive primaries can put an incumbent in a tough position because she must ap-
peal to two different voting electorates. She must please voters in the primary election to
secure her party’s nomination before running in the general election where she must please a
different set of voters. In contemporary elections, the average primary voter is thought to be
more ideologically extreme1 than the average general election voter. Primary constituents
are more likely to reward or punish an incumbent for her voting record than are general
election constituents (Sides, Tausanovitch, Vavreck and Warshaw Forthcoming). Ideologi-
cally extreme voters encourage more ideological challengers to enter at the primary stage,
elevating the likelihood of intra-party competition (Butler 2009; Maestas, Fulton, Maisel
and Stone 2006). Ideological challengers may better fit the preferences of the primary elec-
1 My characterization of primary electorate ideology follows current characterizations in the primary elec-
torate literature. I make no underlying assumptions about an individual’s placement on a scale from liberal to
conservative utilizing policy positions. I am interested in the extremity of an individual’s ideology; this could
just as well be labeled “partisan extremity”
torate, swaying voters away from the incumbent. Faced with divergent constituencies, an
incumbent may choose to appeal more heavily to her ideologically extreme primary elec-
torate instead of the moderate general electorate. To the extent that many members of
Congress are elected from safe districts, an uncertain or vulnerable primary election may
make pleasing primary voters a higher priority. In turn, if an incumbent is trying to win
over ideologically extreme primary voters, she will engage in more ideologically extreme
behavior.
This theory for an ideologically extreme primary electorate pulling incumbents away
from the median voter is intuitive. Current research on ideological candidate emergence
and polarized member behavior fit with this conception of primary elections (Thomsen
2014; Hall 2015; Jewitt and Treul 2018). Anecdotally, examples like the primary election
defeat of Richard Lugar (R-IN) fall in line with this argument as well. However, our ability
to directly investigate the influence of ideologically extreme primary voters is limited by
the lack of better measures for each district’s primary election constituency (Brady, Han
and Pope 2007).
Current measures of primary constituency ideology may not accurately capture district-
by-district heterogeneity in the ideological distribution of constituents. The limitations of
these measures may account for mixed findings on the influence, or even existence, of
ideologically extreme primary election voters (for a review see Hirano, Jr., Ansolabehere
and Hansen 2010; Brady, Han and Pope 2007; Boatright 2014; Clinton 2006; Sides et al.
Forthcoming; Abramowitz 2008). If we want to be able to definitively demonstrate that
primary election voters are more ideological and test claims about their impact on candidate
behavior, we need an new, more direct measure for constituency ideology.
I create a measure of the ideology of primary and general electorates for both parties
at the congressional district level. My approach is a multi-stage process. Using voter files
aggregated by Catalist, LLC, I model constituent ideological extremity as a function of
demographic and geographic predictors. I use multilevel regression with synthetic post
stratification (MrsP) to create ideological point estimates for the primary electorate and
general electorate for each party in a district. This allows me to compare primary and
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general electorate ideology within and across congressional districts.
Examining primary and general electorates for U.S. House districts in the 2012 election,
I show that primary voters are more ideologically extreme than general election voters. I
also find evidence that there is variation in the extent to which primary and general election
voters ideologically diverge. These findings support my theory that the ideological distri-
bution of primary voters is heterogeneous across districts. While primary voters may be
more extreme on average, my estimates suggest that some districts have electorates that
are very ideologically similar. Comparing between parties, I additionally demonstrate that
Republican primary voters are often more ideologically extreme than Democratic primary
voters.
My measure demonstrates the necessity for a district-level examination of electorate
ideology. Candidate behavior is conditional on district context (Fenno 1978; Maestas et al.
2006). Our theories about the influence of primary voters on candidate behavior must be
conditional as well, accounting for ideological heterogeneity across districts. Future work
should tailor expectations for candidate behavior to the specific ideological distribution of
voters in each candidate’s district.
A Need for Electorate-Level Estimates of Ideology
A variety of approaches have been taken to demonstrate that primary voters are ideologi-
cal extreme. Brady, Han and Pope (2007) use vote shares in elections to demonstrate that
primary voters favor more ideologically extreme candidates. Measuring candidate ideolog-
ical positions using FEC data, Hall and Snyder (2015) find similar results. This literature
assumes a spatial model of voting where voter i chooses the candidate j that is the most ide-
ologically proximate to himself. If voter i prefers the ideologically extreme candidate, then
he also should be ideologically extreme. Additional research looks at ideological candi-
date emergence and nomination; it suggests that the emergence of more extreme candidates
is motivated by the preferences of ideologically extreme primary voters (Thomsen 2014;
Thomsen and Hall 2018).
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Several studies use survey data to directly measure the ideological predispositions of pri-
mary voters. Clinton (2006) and Butler (2009) use data from the Congressional Cooperative
Elections Survey (CCES) to show that same-party constituency preferences motivate candi-
dates to move their positions towards the extreme. Jacobson (2009) looks at the ideological
predispositions of primary voters using data from the American National Election Survey
(ANES), finding them more extreme than general election voters. These findings point to
the presence of ideologically extreme primary voters but do not make conclusions about in
which districts we should expect to find ideologically extreme primary electorates.2
A sizable literature argues that incumbent behavior is conditional on her constituency.
Fenno’s (1978) seminal work finds that the representative-constituent relationship is district-
specific. Further work suggest an incumbent will use updated information about her con-
stituency to shift her behavior in the ideological direction of constituents (Rabinowitz and
Macdonald 1989; Kousser, Lewis and Masket 2007; Fleisher and Bond 2004; Sulkin 2005;
Jewitt and Treul 2018; Clinton 2006). Political economy models of two-stage electoral
competition in primary elections predict that an incumbent will diverge from her party con-
ditional on the ideological clustering of her primary constituency (Aranson and Ordeshook
1972; Owen and Grofman 2006; Grofman 2004).3 In theory, the electoral clout of ideo-
logical primary voters should increase with the quantity of ideologically extreme primary
voters in a given district. To understand the electoral influence of primary voters, it is
not enough to know that primary voters can be extreme. We need to know in which dis-
tricts these voters tend to be more extreme, forming expectations about incumbent behavior
accordingly.
A similar argument can be made for candidate emergence. Strategic, politically expe-
rienced candidates are more likely to run when national and local conditions are favorable,
2 Several analyses have looked at the ideological extremity of primary voters at the national or state level,
finding that on aggregate primary voters are not that much more extreme than general election voters (Sides
et al. Forthcoming). These explorations provide interesting insight but mask variance in the ideological dis-
tribution of voters across districts, which could solicit a polarizing effect on incumbent behavior
3 Roemer (2001) also formalizes the role of primary constituents in the context of the median voter theorem,
showing ideological primary voters as a cause of divergent candidate behavior.
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acutely aware of the costs and benefits to running (Jacobson 1989; Hetherington, Larson
and Globetti 2003; Maestas et al. 2006). Theories of candidate emergence in the general
election have been applied at the primary level, finding similar results: candidates run in
primary elections when district-level conditions are the most favorable (Thomsen 2014;
Porter and Treul 2018). Without a way to distinguish one primary electorate from another,
we cannot pinpoint those districts where we would expect an extreme primary electorate
to motivate ideological candidate emergence. If candidate behavior is conditional on a
particular district’s ideological composition and the ideological extremity of the primary
electorate varies across districts, a direct estimate for electorate ideology is necessary to
test for a primary constituency effect on candidate emergence.
Current Conceptions of Primary Voter Ideology
Conventional methods for estimating public opinion use data on individual-level voter pref-
erences from national surveys. Survey respondents can be disaggregated into smaller sub-
samples, for instance by county or congressional district, to estimate voter ideology at the
subnational level (Miller and Stokes 1963; Gelman and Little 1997; Leemann and Wasser-
fallen 2017). However, there is very little survey data on primary elections. National sur-
veys such as the American National Election Survey (ANES) and Cooperative Congres-
sional Elections Survey (CCES) infrequently ask questions regarding primary election vote
choice or participation. Additionally, sampling for these large, national-level surveys is
not representative of each primary constituency for each party at the congressional dis-
trict level. Once survey respondents are disaggregated into subnational units, for example
the primary constituency for the Democratic party in a given district, there is a significant
small-N problem. Limited survey data restricts our ability to use traditional approaches to
estimate primary electorate ideology.
In lieu of a direct measure for electorate ideology, scholars have used other identifi-
cation strategies to pinpoint those districts where we may expect to find an ideological
primary electorate. These approaches infer district ideology by looking at the character-
istics of primary elections that may correlate with the presence of ideologically extreme
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primary electorate. For example, to determine if primary voters influence candidate be-
havior, McGhee, Masket, Shor, Rogers and McCarty (2014) compare districts with open
primary institutions to more closed systems. They assume that states with exclusionary
closed primaries will have more partisan, ideological primary electorates; representatives
from these states should be more polarized. The authors find no evidence that incumbent
behavior is more polarized in districts with closed institutions. Hill (2015) tests McGhee
et al.’s (2014) assumption finding that the distribution of voter ideology within primary and
general electorates does not correlate with a state’s type of primary institution. His work
demonstrates that proxy measures for district ideology can mischaracterize the extremity of
a district’s primary electorate.
In a similar vein, Boatright (2014) and Lawless and Pearson (2008) find little differ-
ence in member behavior when comparing across different levels of primary competition,
assuming that highly competitive elections should produce an incumbent behavior shift to
accommodate primary voter preferences. Jewitt and Treul (2018) argue that close elec-
tions may not lead to changes in incumbent behavior, instead pointing to divisive races —
races that are ideological in nature — as challenges with behavior-altering consequences.
Hirano et al. (2010) find no evidence of incumbent behavior change before and after the
introduction of primary elections in the late 1950’s to early 1960’s. Hill and Tausanovitch
(2017) demonstrate that primary electorates today are more ideological than they were in
the past. No change in incumbent behavior should have been expected after the introduction
of primary elections because primary constituencies in the 1960’s were not yet ideologically
extreme. These types of investigations into the influence of ideologically extreme primary
voters make a strong assumption, inferring that there is ideological consistency in primary
electorates across most districts.4
Restricted by data availability, our capacity to investigate the electoral impacts of pri-
mary voters has previously been limited to these types of approaches. Building on the
groundwork laid by Leemann and Wasserfallen (2017), I employ a new method to develop
4 For additional examinations of indirect measures of primary constituency ideology see Hill and Tau-
sanovitch (2017), Levendusky and Fiorina (2008) and Burden (2001)
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a measure for primary and general electorate ideology in both parties at the congressional
district-level. I demonstrate that the ideological composition of primary and general elec-
tion voters does, indeed, vary across districts. My estimates serve to further our under-
standing of subnational public opinion in the United States and allow for more thorough
investigations of primary constituency influence on candidate behavior.
Subnational Public Opinion Estimation: A Methodological Overview
Significant strides in the study of subnational public opinion have been made recently us-
ing multi-level regression with postratification (MrP). The utility of MrP comes from its
ability to produce more precise estimates of subnational public opinion than traditional dis-
aggregation (Lax and Phillips 2009a). MrP up-weights specific geographies that may be
undersampled in survey data and down-weights oversampled subpopulations to make esti-
mates more representative. This approach developed by Gelman and Little (1997) has been
applied in a variety of contexts to measure public opinion in the United States at the state
and local level (Park, Gelman and Bafumi 2004; Lax and Phillips 2009b; Tausanovitch and
Warshaw 2013; Warshaw and Rodden 2012).
To illustrate how MrP works, consider the example of measuring public opinion on
gun control for each state. In traditional MrP, individual-level opinion provided by sur-
vey responses is modeled as a function of demographic and geographic information. For
example, what does a 20-25-year-old male with a college education in a given state think
about gun control? MrP employs hierarchical modeling to exploit the fact that individuals
are nested within the geographic subunit of interest (in this case their state) and are nested
within other demographic groupings. Hierarchical modeling allows for the borrowing of in-
formation across these groups by leveraging demographic and geographic correlations, thus
compensating for small sample sizes in national surveys. Using the model, a prediction is
made about gun control opinion for every voter type. In other words, a prediction is made
for all combinations of demographic and geographic predictors. To make these predictions
representative at the state level, they are weighted with the percentage of that voter type
within the actual population of the state. Aggregating the weighted predictions by group
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within a state produces an estimate of public opinion at the state level.
To weight — or poststratify — predictions, fine-grain data from the U.S. census is often
employed. U.S. census data is excellent for postratification because: (1) it serves as a
reliable picture of the population, (2) information is broken down by various subnational
units of interest for instance county or congressional district, and (3) data is provided in
the form of joint distributions. This means that the census not only provides a count of
the number of men in a given state but also the number of men who are 20-25 and have a
college education in a given state.
The ability of MrP to precisely measure public opinion at very localized levels makes
it a promising solution for estimating electorate ideology. However, joint distributions are
necessary for MrP; without them public opinion predictions cannot be weighted to reflect
the distribution of voter types in a given population. This stringent data requirement has
made it impossible to use MrP to estimate constituency ideology. The U.S. census does not
release any information on individual-level electoral participation or partisan affiliation. In
other words, there are no available joint distributions for the number of men in a given con-
gressional district who are 20-25, have a college education, and belong to the Republican
party primary electorate.5
A recent development by Leemann and Wasserfallen (2017) relaxes the necessity of
joint distributions in estimating subnational public opinion.6 This variation of MrP –
known as multilevel regression with synthetic poststratification or MrsP — allows for
marginal distributions to be used to impute unknown joint distributions. For example,
with a known joint distribution of college-educated men in a specific district and a known
5 This limitation is not exclusive to examinations of voter participation or partisanship, Warshaw and Rod-
den (2012) could not use age as a predictor in the MrP model for district level public opinion on individual
issue areas.
6 Before MrsP, scholars attempted to circumvent the limitations of MrP to measure district-level ideology
using creative approaches. Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2013) used classic MrP to develop ideological es-
timates of constituents at the congressional district level. Their estimations include all individuals within a
district – voters and non-voters – because the census does not include information about electoral participa-
tion. Hill (2015) additionally used MrP to create primary and general electorate estimates for each party for
each congressional district. Without census-level data to poststratify his predictions, Hill used survey weights.
This approach, however, could bias his estimates if survey weights do not accurately capture population char-
acteristics at the requisite level of disaggregation.
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marginal distribution of registered Republicans in a specific district, MrsP can be used to
impute how many college-educated men in that district are registered Republicans. This
imputed joint distribution is what Leemann and Wasserfallen (2017) call a “synthetic joint
distribution”. Correlations amongst empirical joint distributions of individual-level vari-
ables can be used to help inform the creation of synthetic joint distributions. For example,
if college educated men tend to be more Republican, this information is used to help guide
our estimations. These “adjusted synthetic joint distributions” take into account dependen-
cies across covariates.
Data, Measurement, & Analysis of District Ideology
I use MrsP to create a direct measure for primary and general electorate ideology. MrsP
performs just as well, and in some instances better than, traditional MrP. It does not require
census-level joint distributions that include a person’s electoral participation, which has
prevented its application for this purpose in the past (Leemann and Wasserfallen 2017).
MrsP overcomes the methodological hurdle in producing of a district-level measure for
constituency ideology, but data availability is still an obstacle.
To nest survey respondents within the primary or general electorate for each district re-
quires knowing if they voted in the primary election, the general election, or both. As previ-
ously noted, questions about primary voter participation are highly infrequent in national-
level surveys.7 Further, self-reported participation measures often over-report election
turnout (Butler 2009; Sides et al. Forthcoming; Vavreck 2007). Using validated voter
turnout in the CCES resolves this problem, but drastically reduces already small sub-
samples of respondents nested within each party’s primary and general electorate for each
district.8 The average number of CCES respondents who voted in the primary election
7 For example, the American National Elections Survey only asked about primary election turnout in 1958,
1964, 1966, and 1978. The ANES asked about presidential primary participation in 1992, not congressional
primary participation.
8 The CCES does not directly ask questions about primary voter participation, but instead validates voter
turnout in the primary and general election using voter files. The CCES posed a question about primary
turnout in 2008 exclusively. Voter validation with voter files for the CCES is completed via Catalist data.
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for a given party in each congressional district is approximately 15; some district primary
constituencies have no respondents, a few have as many as 100.9
Instead of national surveys, I use Catalist LLC’s Validated Voter Database as a data
source for MrsP estimation. Catalist aggregates voter files for all 50 states, also drawing
on external data sources to build profiles of individuals. The academic subscription pro-
vides a 1% randomly drawn sample of their database. My sample drawn in 2014 for the
2012 election includes 3.1 million cases, approximately 890,000 primary voters. The Catal-
ist Voter Database includes demographic information, validated election participation, and
party registration when available. This data from Catalist, LLC acts as a good substitute
to survey data, including similar information with a much larger sample size of primary
election voters. However, using the data involves making some assumptions, discussed in
the following section.
Estimating Voter Ideology
To build estimates of constituency ideology by party for each congressional district, I
employ a hierarchical linear model. It is similar to those adopted in previous studies exam-
ining voter ideological extremity (Hill and Tausanovitch 2017; Sides et al. Forthcoming). I
regress an individual’s ideological extremity on a standard set of demographic characteris-
tics including age, gender, education level, and race. I also include indicators variables for
state and congressional district along with dummy variables for 2012 Democratic primary
participation and 2012 Republican primary participation.
9 It is worth noting that pooling surveys creating what is called a mega-poll across CCES years, similar to
the approach used by Warshaw and Tausanovitch (2013), would not work for my purposes. My postratifica-
tion involves using voter turnout for a given election year as the marginal distribution to produce synthetic
joint distributions. This marginal distribution, the number of voters in a given district’s primary and general
election, would change from year to year and make this approach unuseable.
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Ideologyi = β0 + αrace[i] + αgender[i] + αedu[i] + βdemprimary[i] + βrepprimary[i]
+ αage[i] + αstate[i] + αdistrict[i] + ε[i]
α· ∼ N (0, σ2· )
αdistrict ∼ N (γ1PresVote, σ2district)
ε[i] ∼ N (0, σy)
All predictors are modeled using random effects except party primary participation
modeled using fixed effects.10 I let my model intercept vary by congressional district
and state. Random effects are drawn from a zero mean normal distribution, though the dis-
trict level covariate is drawn from a distribution centered on the the Democratic presidential
vote share for that district.11 A discussion of the measurement for each variable in the
model is as follows.
Voter Ideological Extremity
To help clients analyze the electorate and target constituents, Catalist, LLC builds pre-
dictive scores using their Voter Validated Data for a respondent’s ideological extremity.
This synthetic score is scaled from 0-100 with 0 being the most conservative and 100 being
the most liberal. The variable is constructed using more than 150 covariates and is gener-
ally accepted as a reliable measure for relative ideological extremity between individuals
(Hersh 2015).
10 I use fixed effects because I assume Democratic and Republic primary voter ideological extremity is
not drawn from a common distribution. There is no borrowing of information across groups to inform an
individual’s level of ideological extremity. The ideology of Democratic and Republican primary voters will
be fundamentally different.
11 Presidential vote share was calculated as the percent of the two-party vote in a district that went to the
Democratic presidential nominee in the previous election year.
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Age
The age variable in the Catalist database is respondent’s age at the time of the next
general election; subtracting two from this number gives a respondent’s age at the time of
the 2012 election. Only individuals in the voting age population are included in the analysis.
Data on respondent age provided by Catalist is drawn from state voter files.
Gender
This dummy variable equals 1 if the respondent is female, 0 otherwise. Data on respon-
dent gender provided by Catalist is also drawn from state voter files.
Education
State voter files do not include information about an individual’s education level. Based
on geographic information, consumer information, and other covariates, Catalist, LLC cre-
ates a propensity score for a respondent’s likelihood to have a certain level of educational
attainment. Catalist includes six potential bins for respondent education, I collapse this into
three categories: Not High School Graduate, High School Graduate, and Bachelor’s De-
gree/Postgraduate.12 Comparing across these three categories, the respondent is coded for
having the educational attainment of whichever propensity score is the highest.
Race
The race variable provided by Catalist includes race and ethnicity categories different
from those included in U.S. census data. In order to weight model predictions in the pos-
tratification stage of MrsP, these categories are binned to match those in the census. Race
categories include Caucasian, Black, Hispanic, and Other. Data is drawn from state voter
12 The categories originally provided by Catalist for the imputed education variable are the following: Not
High School Graduate, High School Graduate, Some College, Bachelor’s Degree, Bachelor’s or Postgraduate
Degree, Postgraduate degree. These categories proved to be very messy, with Some College, Bachelor’s,
Bachelor’s or Postgraduate Degree, Postgraduate degree having similar propensity scores. I drop the Some
College category, Bachelor’s and Postgraduate are binned together to improve the binning accuracy.
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files and commercial sources.13
MrsP Poststratification
I use this model to calculate predicted values of ideological extremity for all voter types
in the Catalist Validated Voter Database. To make these predictions representative at the
district-level, they are weighted with the percentage of that voter type within the actual
population of each congressional district. The U.S. census provides the joint distributions
for all but two individual-level predictors in the model. The census factfinder does not in-
clude age or voter participation in its joint distributions. For these demographic character-
istics I impute joint distributions using marginal distributions. To account for correlations
amongst individual-level predictors, I use adjusted synthetic joint distributions instead of
simple synthetic joint distributions.
To produce an adjusted synthetic joint distributions for age, I use the marginal distribu-
tion for age provided by the U.S. census. However, the U.S. census provides no information
about voter participation in the primary or general election. In lieu of census data, I charac-
terize the marginal distribution for the Republican (Democratic) primary electorate as the
total number of voters who participated in the Republican (Democratic) primary. For the
general electorate, I use the total number of voters who voted for the Republican candidate
and the total number of voters who voted for the Democratic candidate as my marginal
distribution.
Using voter turnout as my marginal distribution could be problematic for several rea-
sons. First, if a race is unopposed, there is no recorded vote total in that party’s primary.
Therefore, no marginal distribution exists for voter turnout and no ideological estimate can
be produced in that district for the party’s primary constituency. On one hand, this could
indicate that a representative matches her constituency well; on the other, it may simply
be that no challenger decided to run. Regardless, this limits the explanatory power of my
estimates.
13 This other categories matches the “Other” race category in the census; it includes Asian Native-American
/ Pacific Islander.
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Second, voter turnout in elections fluctuates year-to-year, therefore the marginal distri-
bution for primary and general election voters fluctuates year-to-year. This could introduce
bias into my estimates. Some may argue that if turnout in the primary election vacillates,
it is not a good measure of a district’s primary constituency. I would argue otherwise. Hill
(2015) and Sides et al. (Forthcoming) demonstrate that the demographic characteristics and
ideological predispositions of voters participating in primary elections do not vary widely
across years. Per Fenno (1978), primary voters should be the most dedicated individuals
within a constituency. Therefore, while we may see variability in turnout, we should not
see too much variability in the types of voters participating.
Third, defining primary and general election constituencies as only those people who
voted in an election requires making an assumption about who candidates pay attention to
when campaigning. However, incumbent attention allocation and responsiveness has been
widely tested in the literature finding that representatives are more responsive to partisan
voters than non-voters (Fenno 1978; Clinton 2006; Bafumi and Herron 2010; Bartels 2016).
Disaggregation by Primary and General Electorate
Including an indicator variable for a subunit of interest in the preceding response model
allows for estimates to be disaggregated after the postratification step of MrsP by that sub-
unit. For instance, including an indicator variable for state and congressional district allows
for estimates to be disaggregated at the congressional district level. To disaggregate by
primary electorate for each party at the congressional district level requires an indicator
variable for a respondent’s state and congressional district, as well as a dummy variable for
the partisan primary he voted in.
As stated previously, I use party primary participation as a proxy for whether an in-
dividual is part of a party’s primary electorate. Catalist LLC’s Validated Voter Database
provides more thorough information about voter participation than traditional survey data
through the aggregation of state voter files. The dataset provides complete information for
whether a respondent is a voter or non-voter.
The Validated Voter Dataset does not have complete information on which primary a
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voter voted in; data availability varies with a state’s type of primary institution. States with
closed and semi-closed primary institutions require voters to register with a party to par-
ticipate in the primary election. For these states I place voters in the primary constituency
corresponding to their party registration. For independents in semi-closed systems and all
voters in open systems, I do not know for certain in which party’s primary a voter partici-
pated. Additionally, several states with semi-closed systems do not disclose party registra-
tion information in their voter files. In these instances, I assume a voter participates in the
party primary matching their party registration. In the absence of party registration, I use
the Catalist partisanship propensity score as a substitute. Much like the ideological extrem-
ity score, the partisanship propensity score uses covariates in the Catalist, LLC database to
predict an individual’s partisan affiliation. I assume a voter participates in the party primary
most closely matching their party propensity score.
To estimate the ideological extremity of general electorates, I use general election vote
choice as a proxy for whether an individual is part of a party’s general election constituency.
Unlike primary electorate affiliation, I cannot make strong inferences for a voter’s general
electorate affiliation because it is impossible to know for certain which candidate a person
voted for. I classify voters as Democrat or Republican following the same procedure ex-
plained above, using an individual’s party registration whenever available or the Catalist
party propensity score to infer vote choice.
Results
Figures 1 and 2 summarize my initial findings. I have completed estimates for all dis-
tricts that had a contested race in the 2012 primary election. Recall, marginal distributions
for voter turnout are only available for contested primaries. I cannot create primary elec-
torate ideological estimates for districts with an uncontested party primary. The gray dis-
tricts denote those primaries elections that were uncontested or did not have any candidates
run. Therefore, these gray districts have no estimates produced. Further, I only include
states that have partisan primaries in my anlysis, excluding those top-two primary states of
California, Washington, and Louisiana.
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Fig. 1: Republican Party Primary Electorate Ideology by Congressional District
Fig. 2: Democrat Party Primary Electorate Ideology by Congressional District
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Figure 1 depicts ideological estimates for Republican primary electorates, Figure 2 de-
picts ideological estimates for Democratic primary electorates. The scale for ideological
extremity in Figure 1 ranges from 0-50, with 0 being the most conservative. The scale for
ideological extremity in Figure 2 ranges from 50-100, with 100 being the most liberal. In
Figure 1, the districts with the most conservative primary electorates for the Republican
party are shaded lighter. In Figure 2, the districts with the most liberal primary electorates
for the Democratic party are shaded darker. The most notable findings in these figures are
(1) the ideological variation between states, and (2) the ideological variation within states.
Also worth noting is the variation in ideological extremity between Republican and Demo-
cratic district estimates. Republican districts seem to exhibit a higher level of variation in
extremity, while Democratic districts seem to be more consistently moderate. If ideological
extremity in primary constituencies varies by district as well as within and across states,
evaluating primary voters on aggregate will not capture ideological heterogeneity. These
estimates demonstrate the necessity for a direct measure of primary constituency ideology
in evaluations of primary voter influence on candidate behavior.
Comparing primary electorate estimates across districts with similar electoral character-
istics demonstrates how indirect measures for district ideology gloss over this ideological
heterogeneity. Finding similar results to Hill (2015), there is no consistency in the ideolog-
ical extremity of districts in states with the same type of primary institution. Comparing
Nebraska and Georgia, both states with open systems, the Republican primary electorates
in these states clearly have different ideological distributions. States like Florida — which
has a closed system — and Georgia – which has an open system — have comparable levels
of ideological extremity in their primary constituencies despite having different types of
primary election laws.
Moving to Figure 3 and 4, I examine differences in ideology between primary and gen-
eral electorates to investigate if primary voters are more ideologically extreme than general
election voters. For districts in six randomly selected states, I produce ideological estimates
for both party’s primary and general election constituencies. I plot these estimates to ex-
plore their relative ideological extremity. Each point represents a single district. Primary
17
Fig. 3: Democratic Party Primary Electorate vs. General Electorate Ideological Estimates
Fig. 4: Republican Party Primary Electorate vs. General Electorate Ideological Estimates
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constituency ideology is plotted on the y-axis, general electorate ideology is plotted on the
x-axis. Similar to Figures 1 and 2, ideological extremity is on a 0-100 scale with 0 being
the most conservative and 100 being the most liberal.
Figure 3 plots Democratic primary and general electorates; districts falling above the
reference line have partisan primary electorates that are more ideologically extreme than
the general electorate. Figure 4 plots Republican primary and general electorates; districts
falling below the reference line have primary electorates that are more ideologically ex-
treme than the general electorate. In most cases for Democratic constituencies, the primary
electorate is more ideologically extreme than the general electorate. This relationship is
less prevalent when examining Republican constituencies. These mixed findings could be
motivated by several different factors.
First, in this analysis I am looking at a small sample of cases, I may observe greater vari-
ation when I estimate the remaining districts for the 2012 congressional election. Second, to
estimate relative primary and general electorate extremity I require marginal distributions
for both party’s primary electorates and both party’s general electorates. In other words,
if any party’s primary race is uncontested in a district I cannot create an estimate for the
general electorate’s ideological extremity. This means that those districts for which I can
produce estimates may be innately more competitive; both parties ran contested primary
elections in these districts. In turn, I may expect constituencies in this subset of districts to
be generally more moderate. Third, estimating primary constituency ideology in the year
of a presidential election could moderate my estimates. Creating estimates for the 2014 pri-
mary and general election would remove the influence of presidential primary participation.
Discussion & Next Steps
This paper serves as a proof-of-concept: using MrsP, direct estimates of primary and
general electorate ideological extremity can be produced at the congressional district level.
My new measure should encourage scholars to revisit existing findings regarding the in-
fluence of primary voters on candidate behavior. Future theories should be conditioned
on the ideological extremity of each district’s primary electorate, allowing expectations for
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incumbent behavior and candidate emergence to vary across contexts.
Continuing to work on this project, my next step is to conduct robustness checks for
my estimates. Hill (2015) notes, “Without clear benchmarks, it is hard to evaluate the pro-
cedure outside of the statistical theory that demonstrates that both hierarchical models and
post-stratification improve the validity of...estimates to corresponding population statistics.”
(Appendix, 6). Using CCES survey data I will estimate an IRT model to predict individual-
level ideology as a function of survey policy questions as an attempt to validate my measure.
This IRT model will allow for the evaluation of Catalist LLC’s synthetic ideology score in
capturing actual voter predispositions. Even if certain districts do not have enough data to
produce estimates, I can compare my Catalist-based estimates to those districts that could
be estimated with CCES data.
Expanding my dataset to include years beyond 2012 will allow me to average estimates
of primary constituency ideology over multiple years. Thus may allow me to correct for
any bias that may stem from postratification using a single election’s voter turnout. Ideally
in future work on this project when more data becomes available, I will be able to compare
across years to see how widely ideological estimate vary based on election turnout.
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